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Capturing the castle: tenant governance in social 
housing companies 
 
Abstract 
In the contemporary landscape of social housing in Britain, the role of tenants 
on the governing boards of housing companies continues to be seen as 
deeply problematic. While tenant directors are recruited to bring a market-like 
influence to social housing governance, they appear to be approaching their 
positions as directors in a way that is contrary to the drive towards 
management efficiency. This paper adopts a social constructionist approach 
to recast the institutions of housing governance as contested articulations of 
ideology and the ‘problem’ of tenant board members as a hegemonic clash 
between discourses of governance (Mouffe & Laclau 1998). It concludes that 
tenant directors act as a significant dynamic in the political construction of 
social housing today.    
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Introduction 
 
Tenants have been recruited as active participants in a process of 
experimentation in the governance of social housing in Britain that has 
privatisation and the creation of quasi-markets as its main themes (Malpass 
2008).  In a changed landscape of public services, alongside councillors, 
business people and professionals, tenants have become the new governors.  
 
Deployed to bring consumer values and a sense of legitimacy to a 
restructured social housing sector; key to a range of neo-liberal strategies for 
the structural transformation of the welfare state (Pierson 1994), tenants are 
nevertheless the heirs to a strong mutualist tradition that champions ideas of 
self-management and citizen control (Birchall & Simmons 2004) and, perhaps 
as a consequence, their role as directors of social housing organisations is 
ambiguous and contested. This paper sets out to identify the causes of this 
unease and to analyse the influence tenants bring to housing governance. In 
doing so, it seeks to reclaim the agency of tenant directors to act as a 
significant dynamic in the political debate over the future of social housing. 
 
As the “wobbly pillar of the welfare state” (Somerville & Chan 2001: 12), 
housing has provided both Conservative and New Labour governments with 
an uncontested territory in which to trial a new mode of regulation to replace 
the ethos of the Keynesian welfare state (Williams 1994). Since the launch of 
this programme of restructuring in 1980, half of all local authority homes have 
been transferred to registered social landlords or sold under Right to Buy and 
half of the remaining council homes, removed to arms-length management 
(ODPM 2004).  
 
Tenant involvement in governance has been seen by both Conservative and 
New Labour strategists as integral to this new landscape of housing 
organisations. But recurring confrontation has dogged the rise of tenants to 
board level and their position on management committees is at once 
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encouraged and disparaged by Government, the housing profession and the 
housing market. Empirical research into the role of tenants on management 
boards has identified this problem either as one of a failure of tenants to 
conform to the demands of strategic governance (Audit Commission 2004a) 
or as one of resistance by the management and directors of housing 
organisations to the presence of tenants on board (Cairncross & Pearl 2003; 
Platt 1987).    
 
In the tradition of housing research as depicted by Jacobs and Manzi (2000a), 
these studies have taken a positivist paradigm that treats the contemporary 
shape of housing governance as an objective reality and prioritises a search 
for solutions that would enable tenant board members to be integrated into 
the unchallenged structure of housing governance.  Their recommendations 
for action have been variously that tenant board members should be selected 
by interview, rather than election, to ensure their compliance with the 
requirements of governance (Audit Commission 2004b); that housing 
organisations should dispense with tenant directors altogether to enable the 
efficient business operation of social housing companies (Appleyard 2006); 
that tenants should serve as directors only on organisations engaged in direct 
service delivery rather than those at a strategic level (Elton 2006);  or that 
housing organisations should be forced through government regulation to 
accept and increase the number of tenants on their management boards 
(Housing Corporation 2006). 
 
The lack of a consistent approach to resolving this problem highlights the 
need to reconsider the research paradigm.  A social constructionist approach 
could view housing organisations as institutions being actively constructed 
through individual experience rather than existing as fixed and given 
structures to which individuals must adapt.  This viewpoint would position 
tenant directors as contributors to the construction of meaning in housing 
organisations, rather than as problematic individuals who have failed to slot 
into their defined roles.  
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To pursue this new paradigm, this paper begins by setting tenant involvement 
in governance within the context of demands for involvement in decision-
making and considers the position of tenants in relation to housing power 
structures. The next section charts the rise of tenants as directors and the 
subsequent construction of their role as problematic.  A constructionist 
framework based on Foucault (1980; 1990) is then introduced to view housing 
organisations as structures of discourse under contention by interest groups 
and the concept of hegemony developed by Laclau and Mouffe (1998) is 
adopted to depict the construction of meaning within organisations as a 
process of power from which rival discourses can be excluded. A 
methodology based on Fairclough’s (1995) application of critical discourse 
analysis is then applied to research with tenant board members to examine 
the discourse they bring to governance and the paper concludes with an 
assessment of the influence of tenant board members and an appraisal of the 
problems or challenges associated with their role. 
 
Tenant involvement on housing boards 
 
Tenants now make up over 18 per cent of the directors on the governing 
boards of social housing organisations, and they hold one third of 
directorships in the new stock-transfer companies and arms-length 
management organisations (Cairncross & Pearl 2003). The following section 
charts the rise of social housing tenants to these positions of authority.  It 
situates board membership within a tradition of tenant demands for 
involvement in decision-making and reflects on the treatment of issues of 
power in the literature of tenant participation. 
 
It is never easy to determine the part played by particular interest groups in 
the process of housing change, as Pickvance (1976) once observed. The 
restructuring of housing governance carried out since 1980 would not have 
been successful had it not been supported by large numbers of tenants who 
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were frustrated with their housing conditions and the housing management 
they experienced (Clapham & Kintrea 1992).   
 
Tenant ambitions for greater representation in housing decision-making have 
been depicted, not without criticism, as the campaigns of an urban social 
movement on issues of ‘collective consumption’ or of a ‘tenants movement’ 
(Castells 1978; Cockburn 1977; Healey 1982; Grayson 1997; but see 
Saunders 1979 and a recanted Castells 1983 for criticisms).  Contemporary 
resident participation initiatives owe their origins, at least in part, to a series of 
tenant campaigns from 1968-1973 which led to calls for tenant representation 
on council housing committees (Hague 1990).    
 
Birchall (1991) interprets attempts to legislate for tenant representation on 
housing committees during the early 1970s as evidence of tenant demands 
for involvement in management. Initially only four London boroughs allowed 
tenants to take part in council decision-making in this way, granting full voting 
rights to tenants co-opted onto housing committees.  The initiative spread in 
the late 1980s as part of a decentralisation experiment among Labour Left 
councils that won strong tenant support and saw the devolution of 
maintenance budgets to estates administered by tenant sub-committees 
(Pilkington & Kendrick 1988).   Although seen by Sklair (1975) as an attempt 
to incorporate tenant activists and by others as a fairly tokenistic attempt at 
involvement, co-option onto council committees did give tenants the only 
involvement in decision-making open to them outside of the intensive 
commitment required by tenant management organisations (Hambleton & 
Hoggett 1988).  
 
Tenant management of estates was an initiative promoted by the 
Conservative government through Section 16 of the Housing and Planning 
Act 1986 and evangelised by agencies such as TPAS and the Priority Estates 
Project (PEP) using Sherry Arnstein’s highly-charged model of a ‘Ladder of 
Citizen Participation’ (Arnstein 1969).  Steeped in the frustration of the US 
Civil Rights Movement, Arnstein’s ladder conflated participation practices with 
the achievement of power. It placed citizen control at its final rung with the 
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suggestion that tenants who settled for anything less were destined to be 
ignored or patronised (Cooper & Hawtin 1998).  Mobilized tenants 
organisations inflamed by the threat of the Conservative’s Housing Action 
Trust proposals, were a receptive audience for the advocacy of tenant 
management and demand grew (Karn 1993). By 2002, there were 202 tenant 
management organisations in England and another 81 in development 
(Caincross 2002).  
 
Aspirations for tenant ownership emerged out of resistance to the inner-city 
regeneration plans of the late 1960s and the communal living and collective 
decision-making experiments of the squatting movement (Platt 1980). 
Housing co-operatives, championing the principles of ‘community self-
management’, were established by squatters from 1974 (Wood 1980) while 
new-build housing co-operatives were set up in the late 1970s, notably in the 
Weller Streets, Liverpool, where the idea of community ownership and control 
developed from a campaign against council demolition plans (McDonald 
1986). The re-birth of the co-operative housing movement and ideas of tenant 
ownership appeared to run parallel for a time to government strategies; by 
1988 however, it was clear that tenant ownership no longer commanded 
government support as a strategy for restructuring housing governance 
(Clapham & Kintrea 1992). When 75 tenants organisations used the 
Conservative’s Tenants Choice policy to express an interest in becoming 
approved landlords and taking over ownership of their own estates, the 
government vetoed the move.  Tenants Choice had been intended to create 
free market competition in social housing by enabling tenants to switch 
allegiances to private sector or housing association landlords. The 
Conservatives had not anticipated that tenants might want to become their 
own landlords and were unprepared for the interest in community control 
shown by tenants organisations (Lusk 1997). The financial implications of 
publicly funding tenant control in areas with high investment needs made 
these applications unpopular. The tenants of Walterton and Elgin, in 
Westminster, carried out one of the only three tenant-led transfers to go 
ahead.  By the end of 1991, the government had resolved to accept no more 
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applications from tenants to become a Tenants Choice landlord and the 
legislation itself was repealed in 1996.    
 
Arnold & Cole (1988) have argued that Conservative and New Labour 
governments only supported restructuring strategies that did not interfere with 
the business management model of housing governance.  Tenant co-option 
onto decision-making Council committees was killed off by the Conservative 
government in the 1990 Local Government Regulations Act (Zitron 1995), the 
victim of a public management strategy that aimed to establish clear lines of 
demarcation between operational decision-making and political direction 
(Rhodes 1997).  The repeal of Tenants Choice legislation made it impossible 
for any new stock transfer organisation or housing association receiving 
Housing Corporation support to be run solely by tenants.  In Scotland, tenant 
controlled community housing associations or Community Ownership 
schemes continued to be encouraged as a pragmatic demunicipalisation 
strategy (Clapham & Kintrea 2000), but in England and Wales, by the mid 
1990s, the opportunities for tenant ownership and tenant decision-making had 
been severely restricted and tenants organisations who thirsted for an 
involvement in housing governance were channelled towards only two 
options:  the tenant management organisation or the emerging option of board 
membership.  
 
Tenant participation has been seen as offering the potential for empowerment 
(Somerville 1998), but Governments and social landlords have often been 
concerned to limit the possibilities of tenant power and their promotion of 
tenant involvement has been to attain their own aims. Cooper & Hawtin (1998: 
15) argue that tenant participation has been used as a tool to ‘effectively 
reinforce and perpetuate structural inequalities and social exclusion’.  Just as 
landlords have been determined to retain control over participation processes 
and have confined tenant involvement in decision-making to minor 
management issues (Cairncross et al 1994; Hickman 2006), government 
support for tenant involvement in governance has served to underpin a 
market strategy for social housing and to ‘incorporate’ tenants into their 
responsibilities as active citizens (Flint 2004; McKee 2007).   
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Tenant directorships in social housing organisations have been presented as 
offering transformational change in tenant involvement; they are portrayed as 
the rationale for the break-up of council housing monopolies and the creation 
of market-sensitive housing companies.  While social landlords proffer a menu 
of involvement options including satisfaction surveys, focus groups and 
customer panels directed primarily at improving the business efficiency of 
housing organisations (Audit Commission 2004), tenant directorships appear 
to offer the possibilities of control. 
 
Tenants who take up this opportunity must balance the gain in empowerment 
with the restrictions imposed on them as members of a management board 
with a legal duty to promote the well-being of an organisation that is bound by 
Government regulation and hamstrung by financial imperatives (McKee & 
Cooper 2007). 
 
Ambiguities of the role of tenant director 
 
Prior to 1989 only 25 per cent of traditional housing associations had tenants 
on their boards of management, usually co-opted as lone individuals (Platt et 
al 1987).  In the process of restructuring unleashed by the Conservative 
government in that year, the new stock-transfer companies and the short-lived 
Housing Action Trusts all offered one third of the places on their boards of 
directors to tenants.   New Labour embraced the project to restructure the 
governance of social housing and took it into a new dimension with the 
invention of arms-length management and the extension of stock transfer into 
the most resistant urban authorities..  Social housing tenants stood for 
election to these new boards, and often the tenants most involved in the 
negotiations on the transfer process or on the re-packaging of council stock 
as ALMOs, became the new board members (Malpass & Mullins 2002).  By 
taking a role as governors of these housing organisations, particularly the 
arms-length management organisations and transfer associations identified 
with local communities, tenants helped to root the new and fragmented 
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housing organisations in a defined sense of place (Flint 2003).  But the need 
to legitimise new structures of housing governance that would otherwise 
appear unaccountable created an ambiguity around the role of the tenant 
board member.  This section explores that ambiguity and charts the origins of 
the controversy over representation that has clouded tenant involvement in 
governance. 
 
As housing associations replaced elected local government as the main 
providers of social housing, critics of the restructuring focused on a lack of 
accountability in their governance. The absence of election was for Skelcher 
(1998) the most glaring sign of a democratic deficit in these bodies and Hirst 
(1995) recommended that boards of directors should be elected, and that 
consumers should be involved on management boards to bring accountability 
to the quangos. The Nolan Committee on Standards in Public Life (1996) 
considered Housing Associations in its second report on local public spending 
bodies and the Hancock Inquiry, set up by the National Federation of Housing 
Associations (NFHA) in response to this probing, created a platform for a 
debate on the role of tenants on management boards (Kearns 1997). A 
constituency model, with guaranteed places for tenants alongside councillors 
and independents, was adopted for Housing Action Trusts (Karn 1993) and 
stock transfer organisations (Mullins et al 1995) and, partly to win tenant 
support for stock transfer, the new tenant directors on these companies were 
elected to the board by a constituency of tenants (Malpass & Mullins 2002).  
This created an impression of electoral accountability around the new tenant 
directors and implied that they served in a representative role, an 
interpretation that clashed with company law.   The legitimisation of housing 
governance through the election of tenant board members was to create a 
deep-seated tension with the model of housing organisations led by 
professional, experienced and qualified directors.   
 
The project of citizen governance in Britain’s restructured public services is 
acknowledged to have caused friction between the processes of 
representation and those of strategic leadership (Simmons et al 2007). The 
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most problematic aspect of the role of tenant board members is their alleged 
tendency to act as representatives and to concern themselves with 
operational housing issues instead of taking a strategic view of the interests of 
the housing organisation as a whole.  Audit Commission research records the 
exasperation of housing association chief executives with tenant board 
members who insist on bringing up ‘estate-level issues’ at committee 
meetings. It argues for tenants to act as ‘strategists not lobbyists’ (Audit 
Commission 2004a: 43-44). Platt (1987) noted that board members and 
senior officers discouraged tenant directors from taking an advocacy role at 
meetings, and were particularly concerned to prevent them raising specific 
cases or bringing unresolved complaints to the notice of the board. In some 
community-based housing associations in Scotland, Clapham found that staff 
had forbidden tenant board members from taking complaints from residents. 
Perhaps as a result, some tenant directors then avoided all contact with 
ordinary residents (Clapham & Kintrea 2000: 547).  
 
The Housing Corporation’s regulatory code on governance and the National 
Housing Federation’s guidance state unequivocally that tenant board 
members should act as individuals and that their responsibility is solely to the 
organisation. 
 
‘When acting as directors, board members of a Local Housing Company, 
or any other body, owe a primary duty of care to the interests of that 
organisation. Even though board members may have been nominated or 
elected by an organisation or constituency, they cannot be mandated to 
act against the interest of the company on whose board they sit. Thus 
Local Housing Company board members are not delegates from their 
organisation or constituencies. They are individuals acting in a similar role 
to that of a director of a company’ (Zitron 1995 : 43) 
 
Opposition to the inclusion of tenants on the management boards of housing 
organisations has centred on these concerns. In March 2006, it appears that 
Government Ministers seriously considered removing tenants from the 
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management boards of social housing organisations as part of a review into 
the regulation of housing associations launched by the Housing Corporation 
and headed by Sir Les Elton (Morgan 2006). The larger housing associations, 
those that match the turnover, and may increasingly share the values, of large 
PLCs had argued that there should be no place for tenants on their boards 
(Appleyard 2006). Although holding back from that conclusion, Elton argued 
that tenants would have a more valuable contribution to make on housing 
organisations with direct service delivery functions, rather than on strategic 
boards like the parent organisations of group structures (Elton 2006).   
 
Self (1993) argues that the managerial model adopted in Conservative and 
New Labour restructuring strategies was derived from big business 
corporations.  The hallmark of this model, dubbed by Rhodes (1997) the ‘new 
public management’, is a clear divide between a centrally imposed policy 
framework and the professional hands-on managers who are accountable for 
performance.   This model poses questions over the role of the board of 
directors who have little influence on policy and no role in operational 
decisions.  What is left for the board members is to set strategy and to 
position their housing organisation within networks in the local and regional 
market (Greer & Hoggett 1997: 225), what Stoker calls ‘networked community 
governance’ (2004:15). Tenant board members have a role in promoting the 
housing organisation to other residents but they may have little to offer the 
development of the public and private sector partnerships that have become 
increasingly important to organisational survival (Reid 1999). The 
professional, well-qualified, male directors who dominate the boards of the 
larger housing associations are the key players in cementing these networks 
through their experience on the boards of private corporations and their 
contacts across organisations (Cairncross & Pearl 2003:11).  Tenants who 
challenge the distinction between strategy and operational issues, and who 
cannot contribute to the ‘old boy networks’ of housing governance, may be 
seen as a challenge to the new public management of a restructured social 
housing. 
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It could be argued, however, that the boundary between strategic and 
operational issues on housing boards is by no means a clear divide and that it 
should not automatically be seen as an indicator of poor governance for 
tenant board members to raise operational issues (Greer and Hoggett 1997).  
Platt and colleagues maintain that it is the duty of directors to pursue specific 
issues which have implications for policy and to take complaints through 
normal channels, including in the last resort to the board, and that tenants 
should not be disbarred from raising particular cases of general relevance.  
Their 1987 research showed that most housing associations had recruited 
tenants on the understanding that they would act as representatives (Platt et 
al 1987). A good practice guide for the National Federation of Housing 
Associations published in 1990, insisted, despite most interpretations of 
company law, that tenant board members should be nominated by tenants 
associations as representatives, and be resourced and enabled to report back 
to those defined constituencies (Platt et al 1990).     
 
The appointment of tenants to the position of director is conceived in this 
literature as furthering the promotion of tenant involvement in housing 
governance in order to bring standards of democracy and accountability to the 
working of housing organisations.  The concept of tenant participation that 
sees tenant directorships as the pinnacle of a ladder of participation 
opportunities – as decision-making, rather than consultation (Platt 1987: 7) –  
still finds reflection in the polices of social landlords and in government 
strategies for the sector.  Audit Commission research found that tenants were 
encouraged to vote for large-scale voluntary transfer or the creation of arms 
length management organisations by being promised more influence over 
decision-making through access to a seat on the governing body, as if tenant 
directors could act as their representatives (Audit Commission 2004a: 45).  In 
December 2006 the Housing Corporation instructed housing associations to 
facilitate the election of at least one tenant to their board of directors as part of 
an ‘involvement culture’ (Housing Corporation 2006: 20).   
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A discourse of democracy and accountability has been introduced into the 
language of governance through the creation of tenant directors. Concepts of 
empowerment, and of the conferring of power through citizen control, have 
become embedded in a discourse of managerialism while the representative 
processes of democracy have been associated with the obligations of 
company directors.   The promotion of tenant directorships as tenant 
participation has ensnarled an institution of governance with what Birchall 
(1992: 178) called the ‘accountability strategy’ of tenant representation in 
housing decision-making.  Tenant directors have become the bearers of an 
alternative tradition of housing democracy and carry ideas of representation 
and accountability into housing discourse. 
 
 
Researching a tenant discourse  
 
Social constructionism is an approach to understanding ‘how the institutions 
and organisations that comprise a society are changed or sustained as a 
result of interpersonal interaction’, according to Jim Kemeny (2002: 140). 
As a perspective in housing research, constructionism has contributed a keen 
reflexivity that has questioned ‘common sense’ approaches to housing issues 
(Jacobs & Manzi 2000a). It has been applied successfully to understanding 
how certain issues become identified as ‘problems’ and has been a 
particularly useful tool in discerning the exercise of power within organisations 
and the structuring of power through discourse (Jacobs et al 2003).   
 
Michel Foucault has been a towering influence on constructionist theories; his 
writings have contributed to the view of organisations as discursive formations 
and emphasised the regulation of behaviour that takes place within institutions 
as a consequence of the construction of a dominant discourse (Foucault 
1980; 1990).  He portrays organisations as structured around an order of 
discourse that defines the common sense of the institution and sets out its 
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rules and systems: a discursive network of power that serves to constrain the 
actions of the individuals within its field.   
 
Foucault also identified the opportunities for rival discourses to develop within 
institutions and noted their ability to influence or transform the construction of 
power: 
 
‘Discourses can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a 
hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point 
for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it 
reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and 
makes it possible to thwart it. Discourses are tactical elements or blocks 
operating in the field of force relations; there can exist different and even 
contradictory discourses within the same strategy’ (Foucault 1990: 100).   
 
The concept of hegemony advanced by Laclau and Mouffe (1998) provides a 
framework for analysing this process of negotiation and conflict in 
organisations. Drawing on Gramsci’s definition of hegemony, Laclau and 
Mouffe identify the process by which social classes or groups seek to 
establish dominance as a project of discursive construction. In their view, 
hegemonic groups do not simply impose their version of reality on others. 
Instead they co-opt, adapt and are changed by alternative discourses from 
less powerful or contesting groups. Hegemony is developed through a 
process of articulation by which elements of discourse are drawn into a new 
formation, which subtly modifies them to create a collective identity or a 
shared ‘common sense’.   
 
Hegemony, for Chantal Mouffe is: 
 
‘the creation of a unified coherent ideological discourse which will be the 
product of the articulation to its value system of the ideological elements 
existing within a determinate historical conjuncture of the society in 
question.’ (Mouffe 1979:195) 
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Laclau and Mouffe agree with Foucault that institutions are articulations of 
ideologies that are contested by interest groups competing to prioritise their 
way of seeing the world. However, this contest or process of negotiation takes 
place in a ‘terrain of power and resistance’ (Torfing 1999: 101) and while 
some discourses acquire influence, others are excluded. Power, for Laclau 
and Mouffe, is associated with the construction of social identity by means of 
exclusion and when a collective identity is created through hegemony, 
alternative meanings and options are rejected and the social groups identified 
with those meanings are configured as problems; a process that gives rise to 
social antagonism and the development of rival identities.  
 
The work of Laclau and Mouffe contributes themes of power, identity and 
social antagonism to previous constructionist research in housing.  The 
presence of conflicting interest groups in housing organisations has been 
noted in studies that have drawn on the concept of a ‘negotiated order’ 
(Strauss 1978), the theory that organisational behaviour is the outcome of a 
process of bargaining between various factions or social groups. Applying this 
focus, Darcy & Manzi (2004: 145) have described housing management as ‘a 
contested practise’ while Clapham and colleagues (2000: 80) point to 
contradictions in values and ‘shifting and ambiguous’ definitions of roles.  It is 
clear from these studies that the ability of interest groups to affect the 
construction of meaning within housing organisations is relative to their power 
and their ability to dominate the discursive space (Jacobs et al 2003: 442).  
Interest groups which lack power, and social housing tenants are a clear 
example, may embed traces of alternative meanings in the dominant 
discourse while being largely excluded from defining the rules and systems of 
the organisation (Jacobs & Manzi 1996. 
 
Darcy and Manzi (2004) may have uncovered traces of these alternative 
meanings when they claim to have identified three significant trends in the 
order of discourse in contemporary British housing management: discourses 
of technology, commodity and democracy.  While the discourses around 
technology and commodification speak of the introduction of market 
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mechanisms into the social housing sector, the assertion of centralised control 
and the growth of managerialism within housing governance, the discourse of 
democracy combines social welfare concerns and the intentions of social 
control with genuine endeavours to empower tenants and to transform social 
housing into a more democratically organised institution.  
 
Norman Fairclough (1995; 2001) posits that this order of discourse can be 
investigated using a process of critical discourse analysis, a methodology that 
situates social interaction within a structural context and acknowledges its 
relations to power.  Fairclough theorises that the belief systems or ‘ways of 
seeing’ of groups or institutions are developed and embedded as common 
sense through particular ways of talking. He argues that an analysis of words 
or texts can identify these discursive practices and conventions and uncover 
how they construct a representation of society and the position of social 
groups within it. Critical discourse analysis has been applied increasingly to 
housing research studies in recent years (Clapham 2000). Taylor (1999) used 
Fairclough’s framework to uncover bias in stock transfer publicity and the 
same approach was used by Saugeres (1999) to reveal the subjective nature 
of housing management lettings policies.  Discourse methodologies have 
been applied by Haworth and Manzi (1999) to link the growth of underclass 
rhetoric to the introduction of more coercive housing policy, by Clapham et al 
(2000) to analyse the construction of housing management and by Jacobs 
and Manzi (2000b) to identify organisational resistance to performance 
management regimes.   
 
This paper sets out to investigate the articulation of a tenant identity in the 
discourse of housing governance.  It presents the findings of a critical 
discourse analysis of the narratives of tenant board members, based on 
interviews with ten tenant directors from six housing organisations in a sub-
region of the North of England.  The tenant board members were all members 
of local, and in some cases, regional and national tenants organisations and 
were, in this way, representative of the majority of tenant directors on new 
housing organisations set up since 1991 (Malpass & Mullins 2002).   The 
selected housing organisations were arms-length management and local 
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housing companies and were indicative of the models of governance 
introduced to a restructured social housing sector by both Conservative and 
New Labour strategists.  In the new landscape of social housing, these 
companies apply the ‘constituency model’ of housing governance where 
tenants serve as directors alongside councillors, business people and other 
professionals, making up one third of the board (Zitron 1995 : 48). The 
individual interviews were supported by four group discussions conducted 
with 45 tenant board members and activists in order to further identify the key 
framing devices of a tenant-led discourse.  The discussion groups were held 
at a national tenants conference and at two regional conferences attended by 
over a thousand tenants. The names of the interviewees were coded, 
although their gender identity was protected, and the identity of each housing 
organisation removed. This was to protect the anonymity of the tenant board 
members to enable them to talk openly about their experiences. Directors are 
bound by a code of collective responsibility for board decisions and tenant 
directors have been dismissed from their boards for uttering public criticism. 
Two of the tenant directors interviewed sought permission from the Chief 
Executives of their companies before consenting to take part in this research, 
in order to protect themselves from any potential disciplinary action.   
 
Following Hostein & Gubrium (1995) active interviewing was used as an 
interpretive practice and the interviewees were invited to analyse elements of 
their own narrative and to utilise the ways of talking that relate to tenants.  The 
resulting narratives were the product of reflection and interpretation by the 
tenant directors, both as tenants and as board members. An open-ended list 
of questions was used and the interview questions focused on the tenant 
directors’ perceptions of their role as a board member, their reasons for 
joining the board and their activities as board members.  They were 
encouraged to reflect on their relationships with other directors and the 
management team; and their thoughts on the impact of tenants as board 
members, both in their own experience and at a wider level.  The responses 
were coded thematically to plot the development of narratives around the 
reasons why tenants seek housing directorships, their activities on the board 
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and their relationships within the organisations and the communities they 
serve.   
 
Much work has been done in critical discourse analysis on the construction of 
organisational behaviour through metaphor and symbol (see for instance 
Grant 1996) and Yanow argues that people rarely speak directly of belief 
systems, instead they communicate their values and feelings through 
symbolic objects, acts, and particularly the language of everyday life: the 
meaningful stories, myths and rituals that unite groups as ‘communities of 
meaning’ (Yanow 2000: 27).  Critical discourse analysis of narratives of 
identity has pointed to the common use of the pronouns ‘we’ or ‘they’, and the 
application of spatial and temporal references in spoken or written texts that 
serve to evoke traditions and claims of cultural identities (Hall 1992; Barker 
2001).  Accordingly the interview texts were subjected to metaphor, category 
and narrative analysis to unpick references to identity and belief systems.   
 
It should be pointed out, that while the group discussions were conducted with 
tenants from across the county, the majority of attributed material is drawn 
from interviews carried out with tenants from the north of England. That 
geographical restriction and the size of the sample in this study mean that its 
chief value should be to stimulate further and quantifiably wider research. 
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An opportunity to make a change 
 
The analysis of research with tenant board members presented in this, and 
the following section sets out their views on the order of discourse within the 
governance of their social housing organisations.  They identify a dominant 
discourse on housing boards and define their own contribution as tenant 
board members against it, appearing to present an alternative discourse that 
addresses the structure of power and knowledge within social housing 
companies.    
 
All the tenant board members in this study joined the board of their new 
housing organisation as an extension of their existing involvement in the 
leadership of local residents organisations.  Some of them became directors 
to achieve particular changes at a neighbourhood level and they have been 
successful in this. As active members of their local residents associations, 
they felt that there were barriers preventing them from accessing the 
necessary knowledge and personnel to bring about the improvements they 
wanted in their local areas. A directorship gave them the status to talk to 
housing managers and to initiate change in their relations with local staff 
teams.  
 
You’ve got the personal touch. You know the people you’re talking to, 
you’ve met the surveyors etc, and they know you. It does help. It does 
speed things up. 
 
Admission to the board of directors also presented tenants with the 
opportunity to begin to reverse a perceived power imbalance and to assert the 
experience of social housing tenants against the previously dominant views of 
housing staff.  The chance to make a change became their prime motivation 
in deciding to join the board and tenant directors saw themselves as initiating 
a transformation in power structures.  
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For some staff, tenants were just a nuisance and that needed changing, 
that persuaded me more than anything and obviously there were people 
in the ALMO who wanted things to change if I could do my bit. 
 
These tenants have identified that to achieve change in the culture of housing 
organisations, tenants must first achieve positions of status.  This puts them in 
a position to encourage the development of responsive estate-level services 
and to forge relationships of respect between tenants and staff.  
 
‘Nick’ was encouraged as a new tenant board member to meet the staff at his 
local housing office and to go to their team meetings. From this point of 
contact, he encouraged the local housing officer to walk around the estate 
with him. He then invited the local residents association members to join this 
regular walk-about and gradually spread this initiative to neighbouring estates. 
In Nick’s assessment of the impact of tenants on the boards of housing 
organisations, it is this local achievement he stresses.  The effectiveness of 
tenant board membership is experienced through the increased accountability 
of housing staff at an operational level.  
 
The tenants interviewed became board members of housing organisations at 
least partly as an extension of their work in residents associations and they 
were all willing to use their position as directors to act on behalf of tenants in 
their neighbourhood. Some had no reluctance in defining themselves as 
representatives, despite the concerns raised by the Audit Commission and 
others.  They believed that since tenants elected them to the board, they had 
a duty to actively reflect the views of their constituency, and they set out to 
discover residents’ concerns in order to represent them to the housing 
organisation.  They saw it as their responsibility to walk around housing 
estates and to raise any issues with the local manager. They went to the 
meetings of other residents associations and took notes of problems raised in 
order to keep themselves in touch with tenants’ experiences.  To these tenant 
board members there was no dichotomy between their sanctioned role in 
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providing a user perspective and their practice of raising specific issues on 
behalf of their constituents, and if they could not resolve an issue through their 
personal contacts, they were not afraid to raise it at a relevant sub-committee.  
 
Some of the housing organisations included in this study harnessed the zeal 
of their tenant directors and used it to promote relations between the 
organisation and its tenants or customers.  At board meetings, the tenant 
directors were asked to report back what they were hearing on their estates. 
They were encouraged to phone around residents associations to gather their 
views on the housing organisation’s services and were used as mystery 
shoppers to test customer services.  In return they acted as ambassadors for 
their housing organisation, interpreting difficult budgetary decisions to tenants 
on the estates, explaining processes and delays and dispelling any feelings of 
‘them and us’.  While they were discouraged from raising operational issues at 
board meetings, they were actively encouraged to raise individual incidents on 
the agenda at sub-committees and the board members interviewed all 
appeared to recognise the need to generalise from specific issues and to use 
their operational experience to develop policy. 
 
Other organisations imposed a definite boundary between the operational and 
the strategic, and tenant board members who crossed it, risked being 
perceived as intruders in the realm of the managers.  Experienced board 
members took care to differentiate their activities as a director from their work 
as a tenant representative. But they acknowledged that the division was not a 
rigid one: 
 
I am aware that at the board meeting I am not a tenant, I’m a board 
member. But I don’t see why the interests of tenants and the board 
should be mutually exclusive. When I have my board member’s hat on, I 
will still look at things with half an eye for how the operational side of that 
policy is going to affect tenants. 
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The creation of a tenant identity 
 
The creation of a tenant identity, or a essential set of shared interests and 
loyalties that are seen as the ‘tenants’ side’, appears to be constructed in the 
discourse of tenant board members through the use of spatial metaphors and 
personal pronouns.   
 
In the strongest spatial metaphor occurring in the interviews, the process of 
becoming a director of a housing organisation was represented as ‘getting 
inside’.   In these narratives, tenants were characterised as ‘out there on the 
street’, and sometimes ‘down’ there. One tenant director imagined the 
housing organisation as a fortress or castle, a closed system of knowledge 
and power where useful data is kept and key problem-solvers can be found. 
Becoming a board member enabled him to allow tenants ‘inside’ and 
‘forward’.  He was at once the tenants’ guide and their champion: 
 
They know what they want out there, the tenants. They come to us and 
we get it for them. People come to me and I take them to the [housing 
organisation] and it’s tenants ideas that are being taken forward instead 
of being held back 
 
Tenant directors in this study imagined the management of housing 
organisations as ‘inside’ a world of knowledge and power and tenants as ‘out 
there’ in reality.   Power and social class were also expressed in spatial terms, 
with tenants referred to as at the bottom or ‘on the floor’, an image carrying a 
flavour of industrial conflict. More common in the interviews was the use of the 
personal pronoun ‘we’ to create an impression of unity and identity between 
tenants and to define tenants as a separate interest group within housing 
boards. 
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This is clearest in narratives that frequently used ‘we’ to describe tenant board 
members as a group, while other groups on the board or the organisation’s 
senior officers were defocused by being rendered in passive voice.  ‘Karen’ 
used a reference to school days to create a lively image of tenant directors as 
a group of friends. She depicts the tenant board members as having their own 
codes of behaviour, their own leadership structures and a shared sense of 
identity on the board. She expects the other tenant board members to always 
support her in board discussions and sees tenant board members as a block, 
separate from and sometimes opposed to, to the other directors and officers 
of the organisation.  
 
We all encouraged each other. The tenant directors wanted a spokesman 
and it was me. Some of them were a bit nervous at putting their hands up. 
They used to pass pieces of paper round to me, ‘can you ask this?’ – like 
being in school. 
 
The tenant board members in this study clearly perceived the existence of a 
power structure within boards which in the main, they appeared very willing to 
accept, while maintaining a set of values that they characterised as ‘the 
tenants’ side’.  They saw their contribution on the board as injecting an 
element of lived experience to deflate and undercut what would otherwise be 
an abstract and technical discourse. 
 
On the business side, they sometimes forget other people don’t 
understand; you can pull them up and say – you’re on about this 
percentage or that – can you just explain it in lay terms. You’ve got a 
layperson’s understanding to it and it brings them down a bit. Brings it 
down to street level. 
 
But the language of finance clearly undermined the confidence of the tenant 
directors to challenge views expressed at board meetings and obstructed 
them when they wanted to pursue their own policies.  The tenant directors felt 
they were listened to at board meetings, but that anything they suggested 
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would be subjected to rigorous financial appraisal, a complex process in 
which they felt they did not have the technical skills to participate. 
 
It was clear that some tenant board members internalised these economic 
values and accepted them as common sense. In this excerpt from one 
narrative, the tenant board member indicates his acceptance of the ‘natural’ 
primacy of financial judgements. He uses the analogy of his weekly 
supermarket shop to illustrate how housing organisations must work to a 
budget, and in doing so, distantly echoes Margaret Thatcher’s populist 
articulation of housekeeping as a metaphor for neo-Liberal economic 
practices (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 170).   
 
It’s only the same at a far bigger scale. I say to tenants, well look, the 
[housing organisation] don’t go to Harvey Nicks to buy the [kitchen] units. 
There’s a limit to how much you can spend per house. I try to bring the 
working man’s views – the tenants views – to the board but at the same 
time using commonsense and logic about what we can achieve. 
 
In this narrative it can be argued that the discourse of the tenant board 
member has been articulated to a housing governance dominated by the 
discourse of the ‘new public management’.  The interviewee has accepted the 
hegemony of this discourse and adopted it as the framework that guides and 
limits his actions.  Other tenant directors seemed more aware that they were 
engaged in constructing a compromise between different value systems. They 
believed that the interests of business and the satisfaction of tenants were 
mutually compatible but they were aware that at some point these two 
discourses might diverge.  If that divergence occurred, they felt they would be 
forced to choose between their identity as tenant activist and their position as 
board member.  
 
If it’s going to be bad for tenant satisfaction, it’s going to be bad for 
business. If it got to the point that the two things were clashing to a level 
where I was uncomfortable, then I would walk away from the board 
because at the end of the day I’m still a tenant activist first. 
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When that clash did occur, its effect was to detach the identity of tenant board 
members from the interests of the board and to encourage tenant directors to 
separate themselves conceptually from the dominant discourse in housing 
governance. Two interviewees identified a significant boardroom incident as 
the formative moment when they became aware that the interests of social 
housing tenants were not shared by the other board members...   
 
For ‘Karen’ this defining moment came when the senior management of her 
housing organisation recommended the immediate withdrawal of rent 
collection services from local housing offices.  Although consultation results 
showed that most tenants were opposed to the withdrawal of cash collection, 
a majority of the board finally agreed to the proposal and rent collection points 
were closed at all housing offices, against the wishes of the tenant directors. 
 
I feel badly let down by that as a tenant. We were listened to and allowed 
to put our point of view across but we just felt squashed. 
 
As a result of this ‘coming of age’, Karen’s evaluation was that tenant 
influence on housing governance is largely illusory. She believes that tenant 
directors are manipulated and fooled into thinking they are influencing the 
debate, when in reality all they can do is ‘kick it around’ .  Karen had to accept 
collective responsibility for an unpopular decision and, as a tenant 
representative had to pass on the decision of the board, and defend that 
decision as a board member. She felt forced to betray the trust of the very 
people she aimed to represent.  
 
Nick’s ‘coming of age’ took place at a board meeting that approved the 
demolition of 600 homes on the grounds that it was not economic to renovate 
them. In his narrative the board meeting is graphically imaged as ‘eerie and 
divisive’; trade unionists protested outside the building while inside tenants 
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voted against the resolution but again failed to prevent the demolition plans 
being approved. For Nick this was the moment he lost any belief that tenants 
could influence housing governance and lead the debate in favour of tenants’ 
interests. 
 
Certainly that was the end of it for me. Every tenant voted against. It was 
a business decision pure and simple and what was best for tenants 
wasn’t even an option at the end. 
 
In both these narratives, the tenant constituency – one third of the board – 
was defeated by the votes of the other two constituencies who supported the 
recommendations of the chief officers.  This situation enabled the tenant 
board members to identify themselves as a united group and to define their 
interests – retaining a local service and protecting tenants’ homes respectively 
– in opposition to the wishes of the housing organisation’s managers.  
Detached from the dominant discourse, and alienated by their exclusion from 
the decision-making process, these tenant directors now saw themselves as 
an oppositional sub-culture within the board, isolated and combative and with 
their own distinctive agenda for housing governance. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The tenant directors in this study displayed a burgeoning sense of identity that 
distinguished them from other board members and from the dominant 
discourse of their social housing organisations.  Their aim as tenant directors 
was to bring about improvements to the housing service at an operational 
level and to raise the status of tenants in the decision-making process. In 
seeking to achieve these aims, they actively sought out tenants’ views in 
order to inform the board’s policy making and, at a neighbourhood level, used 
their influence to pioneer a participatory approach to decision-making.  They 
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perceived the existence of more dominant discourses in housing governance 
and often felt that the needs of tenants were placed in secondary importance 
to commercial concerns but, in the main, they were willing to accept this 
discourse, recognising it as ‘common sense’ while championing a tenant 
identity at board meetings.  The distinctness of this tenant identity was visible 
particularly during clashes at board level over operational areas of housing 
policy. It was clear at these moments that a separate tenant discourse 
existed, defined in opposition to the views of other board members and to the 
senior management of the housing organisation.   
 
This research may suggest that tenant board members approach their 
directorships, in the main, with definite goals, focused on cultural change, in 
challenging power structures or in achieving more participatory decision-
making. In this they appear to mirror the principles of self-management, 
collective decision-making and participatory democracy that flourished at an 
earlier stage of the restructuring of housing governance.  Applying the 
concept of hegemony developed by Laclau and Mouffe, it could be argued 
that the discourse of new public management has both limited the possibilities 
for alternative models of governance and won to its cause many of the 
tenants who hold to those principles.  Board membership has enabled tenants 
to seize an opportunity to make improvements to their status and to their 
influence in decision-making at an operational level in housing organisations.  
To a varying degree housing organisations have welcomed this perspective; 
however, it is clear that tenant aspirations are not easily assimilated into the 
current values of social housing organisations. While tenants may well have 
joined the competing interest groups that Jacobs et al (2003) see as 
negotiating the definitions of contemporary housing, they are the least 
powerful and perhaps the easiest to exclude.  
 
The discourse of tenant board members, with its stark awareness of power 
relationships, and its deeply felt ambitions for participatory governance 
competes uneasily with the more dominant themes in housing organisations 
of commodification, technology, social welfare and social control.  While some 
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tenant board members have been subsumed within this hegemonic discourse, 
and others are content to take the long view and work within it, there may be 
those tenants who view the governance of housing organisations as a castle 
they have yet to capture.  
 
. 
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